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Abstract— This paper focuses on coexistence and self- 
coexistence challenges between secondary heterogeneous wireless 
networks/users sharing TV Whitespace spectrum. The 
coexistence problems arise from having several primary and 
secondary networks of different technologies cohabiting the same 
licensed spectrum simultaneously. The self- coexistence problems 
arise from many secondary systems /users coexisting at the same 
place while using identical or different technologies. In 
particular, fair distribution of available spectrum becomes a 
serious issue. In this work we use a game theoretic approach to 
model the self-coexistence problem as a competitive game 
between secondary networks. We show that our game belongs to 
the class of congestion-averse games which are known to posses 
pure Nash Equilibria. This leads us to a decentralized approach 
for spectrum sharing among systems with different PHY/MAC 
characteristics. We show that our proposal outperforms other 
centralized algorithms in terms of user fairness and per-user 
theoretical data rates. 
Index Terms—cognitive radio, self-coexistence, congestion-
averse games 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ith the and almost universal deployment of 
‘handheld’ IT technology the need for continuous 
wireless internet access has become a necessity, almost 
everywhere in the world. This creates severe congestion in the 
frequency spectrum, especially in urban areas where the 
number of users is already high. The optimal solution is to 
develop cognitive radios which will behave as secondary users 
and use the spectrum whenever it is not being used by primary 
users. A cognitive radio is a radio that can change its 
transmission parameters based on interaction with the 
environment in which it operates [1]. In 2009 US and UK 
regulatory bodies have approved the use of cognitive radios in 
TV White Spaces because with the advent of analog to digital 
transition in TV broadcasting, a substantial amount of 
spectrum has become available in TV bands. The digital 
transition was completed in US in 2009 and UK in 2012 
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[2].The unused TV spectrum that has become available for use 
after digital transition in TV broadcasting is called  TV White 
Space (TVWS) and its capacity is considerably high. 
According to Ofcom [3] research, there is more than 150MHz 
of interleaved spectrum in over 50% of locations and 100MHZ 
of interleaved spectrum in 90% of locations in UK. Most 
available (unused or vacant) channels can be found in less 
densely populated areas, such as in developing countries or 
rural areas [4]. Frequency bands corresponding to TVWS 
spectrum are: VHF 30-300 MHz and UHF 300-1000 MHz 
except for the channels reserved for emergency transmissions 
and wireless microphones [5]. The TV White Spaces are 
convenient for two main reasons: the first one is their superior 
propagation characteristics for wireless communication which 
enable larger coverage, and the second one is that 
infrastructure requirements needed are comparably lower than 
higher spectra which makes it ideal for rural and 
underdeveloped areas where connection through optical fiber 
is very difficult [6].  
Because cognitive radios might be used for different 
purposes and operate with different technologies, coexistence 
and self-coexistence problems arise. Coexistence is the 
situation that arises when primary users and cognitive radio 
devices (secondary users) exists/operate in the same time and 
location, whereas self-coexistence is the existence in time and 
space among many cognitive radio users or networks which 
can be of the same or different type. To overcome these 
problems the devices will have to continuously sense the 
channel to detect primary and secondary user transmissions 
and ensure that primary users are protected at all times. In case 
that the secondary user is using the spectrum and a primary 
user starts operating, then the secondary user is obliged to 
immediately vacate the channel in order to avoid causing 
interference to the primary user. To ensure this, the UK 
regulator, Ofcom and Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) in the United States, have proposed three methods to be 
used by secondary users: beacons, sensing and geo-location 
with database [7]. When beacons are used as a controlling 
method, secondary users will only start transmitting if they 
have already received a beacon signal recognizing the vacant 
channel. The drawback of this method is that it requires the 
infrastructure of beacons to be implemented and maintained 
[8]. With sensing, the secondary users will sense the spectrum 
and try to detect the presence of primary users based on the 
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amount of energy received. Secondary users may operate 
when they do not detect any primary signals. However, in the 
case of cognitive devices, this is not a straightforward task as 
it involves detecting other signal characteristics such as 
modulation and bandwidth, thus increasing device complexity 
and cost [9]. The third technique uses geo-location and 
databases [10]. Secondary users have to send a query to a 
database which has all the information regarding the spectrum 
usage in the vicinity during the specific time period. Then the 
database will respond with the list of available frequencies 
including all transmission parameters that need to be followed 
for the secondary transmission to start. Secondary users, 
however, must have geo-location capability, while the 
database must be kept updated at all times, which incurs 
additional overhead. An additional challenge on using geo-
location and database access is when secondary users are 
indoors where GPS connectivity may not be available due to 
the signal disruption from buildings, walls, etc. [11] .  
Following the decision by US and UK to allow 
opportunistic use of TVWS several standards were developed 
to facilitate its practical implementation such as: ECMA-392, 
IEEE 802.11af, IEEE 802.16h, IEEE 802.22. Because 
cognitive radios might be used for different purposes and 
operate with different technologies, coexistence and self-
coexistence problems arise. The main challenge arises when 
the various systems using the same spectrum have different 
operating parameters (transmit power, bandwidth, MAC/PHY 
layer, etc.) and also because the different networks tend to 
selfishly occupy the spectrum to satisfy their own needs 
without considering the need of other networks that are 
cohabiting the same spectrum.  
To this end, IEEE 802.19.1 standard was introduced to be 
used for coexistence of networks of different types, in 
particular for coexistence between 802.22 and non 802.22 
networks [12]. The main limitation of this standard is that it 
tackles the problem of coexistence based on a centralized 
system architecture. In this coexistence enabling system, the 
coexistence decisions are made at coexistence manager which 
is responsible for making the operating decisions.  
A. Contributions of this paper 
In this paper, we propose an autonomous decentralized 
algorithm based on congestion-averse games for self-
coexistence decision making in TVWS. In congestion-averse 
games players strategically choose from a set of resources and 
derive utilities that depend on the congestion on each resource. 
This algorithm addresses the challenges of self-coexistence in 
terms of fairness and efficiency of resource allocation.  
In summary, our approach and key contributions are as 
follows: 
A realistic model for the self-coexistence problem in TVWS 
is provided which captures both the relationship between the 
different networks as well as the relationship between a 
network and its users. Moreover the model does not consider 
only specific types of networks, but can be easily extended to 
cover as many types of various technologies as necessary. 
The self-coexistence problem, modeled as an optimization 
problem is then transformed into a competitive game between 
networks using game theory concepts. The utility and cost 
functions are defined for each network, capturing the different 
interactions between the different networks. We prove that the 
game we model belongs to the class of congestion-averse 
games, which are known to possess some desirable qualities 
such as pure Nash Equilibrium.  
Finally, a decentralized algorithm, known to reach the Nash 
equilibrium in congestion-averse game in polynomial time is 
applied to solve the self coexistence problem. The algorithm 
was adapted and rewritten in the context of the self-
coexistence problem.  
Using numerical evaluations we show that the proposed 
approach easily outperforms centralized algorithms proposed 
in literature in terms of bandwidth demand, fairness, and 
achieved theoretical user rates. We also show that the 
decentralized application of our algorithm performs almost as 
good as a centralized application of the same algorithm, used 
as a benchmark for evaluating the decentralized algorithm. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
II summarizes the related work on cognitive radio networks 
and we present our network model in section III. In section IV 
we formulate our game approach while in section V we 
evaluate our approach using simulation results. Finally we 
conclude the paper in section VI.  
II. RELATED WORK 
While research on coexistence of heterogeneous networks 
in TVWS spectrum bands has been widely investigated, very 
little work has been done to tackle the problem of self-
coexistence. Coexistence and self-coexistence of 
heterogeneous wireless networks in TVWS has been shown to 
be a major problem. Without the use of coexistence 
mechanisms, the utilization of TVWS spectrum will be 
significantly reduced. It was shown in [13] that without the 
use of coexistence mechanisms, 92% of available spectrum is 
overlapped by neighboring networks. Based on the proposed 
architecture in [14], the coexistence mechanisms are classified 
into three groups: centralized, coordinated and autonomous 
mechanisms. The difference among these coexistence 
mechanisms relies on where the coexistence decision is made:   
1) Centralized mechanisms - use a database in which all 
coexistence information is collected and stored centrally and 
information to users is passed through internetwork 
coordination channels. However, this solution is costly and 
also ineffective when there are many coexisting devices or 
even networks that do not want to be part of a centralized 
control system. In addition scalability can also be an issue. 
2) Distributed mechanisms - All the decisions regarding 
interference mitigation are made individually by each network 
or device and then the information is passed to others through 
control channels. This solution also incurs communication 
overhead and depends on the willingness of the networks to 
exchange information. Furthermore, it relies on the existence 
of a common control channel and assumes that all coexisting 
networks use the same access technology in order to be able to 
decode each other’s messages. Again, in this case scalability 
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problems may arise. 
3) Decentralized mechanisms -All the decisions for channel 
selection and interference mitigation are done only by 
individual observations. Internetworking between different 
technologies and scalability, in this case, should not be a 
problem. 
Few algorithms have been proposed in the relevant 
literature that deal directly with the coexistence and self-
coexistence problems at heterogeneous cognitive radio 
networks at PHY or MAC layer. Most of such algorithms are 
centralized or assume some form of coordination between 
participating networks. 
The authors in [15] came up with a hybrid scheme for 
resource allocation. While in centralized scenarios the 
decision on the network users are imposed by network 
manager, in decentralized scenarios the authors used a game 
theory approach, namely Stackelberg games, in which the 
networks broadcast the load information to all network users. 
The main drawback of this proposed scheme is that the 
decentralized solution does not use completely autonomous 
mechanisms.  
The authors in [16]  proposed a hybrid scheme for 
heterogeneous networks looking specifically at the 
coexistence problem between 802.22 and 802.11af networks. 
The proposed solution, targets the problem of hidden 
terminals. However, the authors assume the presence of a 
802.19.1 controller to manage the coexistence thus its 
performance relies heavily on centralized exchange of 
information.  
In [17] the authors proposed an autonomous scheme for 
enabling coexistence between IEEE 802.11af and 802.22 
networks. The basic idea is to use the sensing antenna 
available at the 802.22 receiver to send out a busy tone in 
order to protect its communications from hidden 802.11af 
terminals. The proposed algorithm is tailored to the problem 
of coexistence only between 802.11af and 802.22 networks 
and completely ignores the general problem of self-
coexistence within secondary networks as well as any lack of 
fairness achieved during channel access.  
A framework for modeling spectrum sharing as a 
congestion game is provided in [18]. Congestion games [19] is 
a game theoretic modeling for resources competition settings 
in which the associated payoff (cost) of  the players  is a 
function of the level of congestion (i.e., the number of users 
using the corresponding recourse). In [18] the authors propose 
to expand the notion of the resource so that the resource 
allocation problem satisfies the congestion game model. They 
proceed to define the game for different scenarios; however 
they focus on the classical resource allocation problem and do 
not consider the specificities of the self-coexistence problem 
in cognitive networks.  
A recent work dealing with the problem of coexistence in 
heterogeneous wireless systems [20] proposes a centralized 
algorithm that deals with the problem of spectrum sharing 
among secondary networks and compares the results to other 
Coexistence Decision Making (CDM) algorithms that are 
specified on IEEE 802.19.1 standard. Nonetheless, this is a 
centralized algorithm which imposes a considerable amount of 
communication overhead and complexity.  
In addition, there are also a few autonomous approaches 
available in the literature. The self-coexistence problem 
between wireless regional area networks was presented in 
[21]. The channel assignment problem was formulated as a 
non-cooperative potential game with utility functions aiming 
at maximizing the spatial reuse and minimizing the 
interference. Even though the main objective of this paper is 
the self-coexistence, the main drawback is that they look at the 
self-coexistence within secondary users only for WRANs 
(Wireless Regional Area Networks).  
In [22] authors also proposed a game theoretic approach for 
solving the coexistence problem between cognitive radio 
networks. The problem is formulated as an uplink channel 
allocation problem in a non-cooperative game. However, the 
authors address the coexistence problem only in the uplink. 
Furthermore they do not consider the presence of 
heterogeneous networks but rather assume that all secondary 
networks are of the same type, but belonging to different 
operators.  
In our proposed approach we also apply game theory to 
address the problem of self-coexistence in TVWS, between 
secondary networks of different types. We consider the usage 
of independent mechanisms where there is no central manager 
for decision making, no database for information queries and 
storage and no common physical communication channel 
between networks of the same and different type for 
information exchange. The self-coexistence and interference 
mitigation are ensured only based on the individual 
observations, which means that there is no need to 
synchronize and coordinate between networks to reach a fair 
solution, i.e., a decentralized mechanism, as defined earlier. 
III. SYSTEM SCENARIO AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
We consider a scenario where different types of secondary 
networks compete to gain access to a pre-determined set of 
TVWS channels, which we assume, are already vacated by 
their primary users. Each secondary network serves a number 
of secondary users and is controlled by a central unit (base 
station or access point).  One such scenario is shown in Fig. 1. 
We denote the set of competing networks as N, and the set 
of available TVWS channels as C. Individual networks are 
denoted by lower case n, while individual channels by c. Each 
network may have different transmitting parameters, i.e., 
transmit power Pn, and may operate at different bandwidths  𝜔!.  Each network may have a certain demand, in terms of 
spectrum which we denote by dn and which is expressed in 
number of channels demanded. We assume that all channels in 
the set C have equal bandwidth such that it satisfies the most 
demanding network. 
Each secondary network serves a number of secondary 
devices that are located within the operating range of the 
associated network. We denote the set of users associated to 
network n as Un and individual users by u. In these kinds of 
scenarios a self-coexistence decision making mechanism 
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(SCDM) is used to ensure the best use of TVWS resources in 
terms of throughout and fairness, among the different 
cognitive networks. 
 
Fig. 1. System scenario 
 
In this paper we assume a decentralized configuration in 
which secondary networks make coexistence decisions on 
their own, using individual sensing information, as well as 
information received by the secondary devices under their 
coverage. Therefore we do not assume the existence of an 
additional central entity or communicating channel between 
the secondary networks.  
The task of the SCDM is to decide which available 
channels, which are free of incumbent users, should be 
allocated to which secondary network in a way that i) enables 
coexistence between the different networks, ii) meets the 
bandwidth/data rate demands of each network and iii) ensures 
fair allocation among the different networks.  
In general, each network may choose any subset of 
channels, thus allowing for more than one network to be 
allocated on the same channel simultaneously.  
Close attention in such cases must be paid to the 
interference between the different networks, which tends to be 
heavily asymmetric due to the varying transmit powers. 
Interference is caused when two or more networks operate in 
the same channel, and the users of each network receive 
harmful transmission from the other base stations in addition 
to the useful transmissions coming from their own base 
station.  
The interference caused at the final secondary users 
determines the signal to noise and interference ratio (SINR) 
which proportionally affects the channel capacity and hence 
influences the quality of the service each network is able to 
provide to its users.  
The SINR, denoted by 𝛾!,!, at a receiving user u of network 
n on channel c is given by: 𝛾!,! = !!,!,!!!!!,!!!! !!,!,!!!!!,!!∈!∧!!!             (1) 
 
where 𝑃!,𝑃! represent the transmit powers of network n, 
and m which are transmitting simultaneously on channel c. 
Attenuation experienced by the signal transmitted by the base 
station of network n when reaching user u is denoted by 𝑎!,!,!, 
and similarly 𝑎!,!,! is the attenuation from network m. The 
signal attenuation depends on many factors, such as distance, 
line of sight, shadowing and multipath. For the purposes of 
this work, we have considered the free-space path loss model 
for the attenuation values, however more realistic and complex 
models can also be used.  Hence, the value for the attenuation 𝑎!,!,! is given by the expression: 
 𝑎!,!,! = !!!!,!!!                                                            (2) 
where 𝑑!,! is the distance between the base station/access 
point of network n and user u, and 𝜆! is the signal wavelength 
(inversely proportional to the signal frequency).  
We use  a binary variable 𝜎!,!  to indicate whether channel  
c has been selected by a specific network, i.e., 𝜎!,! = 1 if 𝑐 ∈ 𝑠!. The noise level is denoted by 𝑁!. To summarize, the 
expression in the numerator represents the useful power 
received by user u from network n, while the expression in the 
denominator represent the noise (expressed by a constant) plus 
the interference coming from other networks transmitting 
simultaneously on the same channel, i.e., the total harmful 
power received by user u from all other networks other than n. 
It is in the interest of every secondary network, therefore, to 
maximize the SINR obtained by the users it serves on the 
channels it selects. Globally however, it is important to 
maximize the SINR obtained by all users in all the networks. 
Consider for example the following global non-linear 
optimization problem: max!!,! !!,!,!!!!!,!!!! !!,!,!!!!!,!!∈!∧!!!!"#!∈!!!∈!    (3) s.t.  𝜎!,! ∈ 0,1                                     (3a)         𝜎!,! ≤ 𝑑!!∈!                                   (3b) 
 
Note that the first constraint (3a) is related to the binary 
nature of the allocation variables 𝜎, indicating whether a 
network has selected a certain channel or not. The second 
constraint (3b) limits the number of channels selected by a 
network n so as not to exceed the network’s demand, 𝑑!. 
Due to the nature of the 𝜎!,! variables, the global 
optimization problem is a nonlinear integer programming 
problem which is known to be NP-hard; since the linear 
integer programming problem is a special case of it and the 
latter is known to be NP-hard [23]. It should be noted, that 
such a formulation does not account for fairness in the system, 
therefore it is clear, that due to the  complexity of the task, a 
different approach, preferably less complex and decentralized 
is required.  
To this end, we use game theory concepts to reframe our 
problem. We model the problem of selecting the channels as a 
non-cooperative game, in which the players are the secondary 
networks competing for the vacated TVWS spectrum. Each 
network executes an algorithm in order to make a SCDM 
decision, that is, adopts a strategy that eventually leads to a 
Nash equilibrium (NE). A NE is a game solution, in which no 
player can gain anything by unilaterally changing his own 
strategy. This ensures that once a NE is reached, no network 
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has an interest in changing the channels it has selected. This 
equilibrium may be disturbed when a change in the 
environment is noticed, such as the appearance of primary 
user transmission or the discovery of an additional secondary 
network. It is clear, however, that a game-theoretic approach 
does not ensure that an optimal solution is reached. 
Nevertheless, in Section V we show that the channel 
allocation strategy through our game-theoretic approach 
performs better than existing centralized solutions especially 
in terms of fairness. 
IV. FORMULATING SELF-COEXISTENCE AS A CONGESTION 
GAME 
We address the coexistence problem using game theory 
which is an appropriate mathematical tool to obtain a multi-
objective distributed solution in a scenario where entities, i.e., 
secondary networks, share the same pool of resources, i.e., 
TVWS channels.  
A. The congestion-averse game 
We formulate the problem of SCDM as a competitive 
congestion-averse game between secondary networks where 
each network wants to maximize its own utility. Classical 
congestion games were originally defined by Rosenthal in the 
seminal paper [19]. Congestion games are of particular interest 
to us since they were proven to admit at least one pure-
strategy NE. 
These games are characterized by a set of players N and a 
set of elementary resources C. Each player can choose as its 
strategy any subset of elementary resources. The utility that 
can be obtained at each resource depends strictly on the 
number of players selecting the same resource. The logic 
follows that the higher the number of players selecting the 
same resource the higher is the congestion, therefore  the 
lower is the utility derived by a player selecting that resource. 
The final utility of each player is then calculated as the sum of 
the utilities obtained at each selected elementary resource. 
Formally we define a congestion game by the 4-tuple : 𝐺 = {𝑁,𝐶, 𝑆! ! ∈! , (𝜋!)!∈!}                            (4) 
where N is the set of players corresponding to the secondary 
networks; C is the set of elementary resources (channels);  𝑆!  ⊂ 2!  is the strategy set of player i and 𝜋!:N → 𝐙 is the 
payoff associated with channel c. The payoff 𝜋! is a function 
of the total number of users using channel c and is assumed to 
be non-increasing. A player in this game aims to maximize its 
total payoff which is the sum total of payoff over all channels 
its strategy involves. 
Denote 𝒔 = 𝑠!, 𝑠!,… ,𝑁  the strategy profile of the game 
G, where 𝑠! ∈ 𝑆!, then user i’s total payoff is given by 
 𝜋! 𝒔 =  𝜋! 𝜂!(𝒔)! !!                                                (5) 
where 𝜂!(𝒔) is the total number of users using resource c in 
profile s. 
We argue that channel allocation process in the context of 
SCDM can be formulated as a congestion game, with N being 
the number of secondary networks competing for resources 
and C the set of TVWS channels available for allocation. 
Clearly, if we express the utility of each network as a function 
proportional to the signal-to-noise-and-interference ratio 
(SINR) obtained by its end users, it will depend on the number 
of other networks simultaneously selecting the same channel, 
albeit not directly. 
We note from SINR expression in (1) that the SINR itself 
does not depend only on the number of networks selecting the 
same channel but also on their identity, i.e. their individual 
effect on other networks. Therefore, we define a utility 
function that is similar to the SINR expression, but that 
depends strictly on the number of the networks 𝜂!  selecting a 
specific resource c: 𝜋!,! = !!,!!!!!!!,!!!                 (6) 
We now proceed to define parameters 𝛼!,! and 𝛽!,!: 
 𝛼!,! =  !!! 𝑎!,!,!!∈!!            (7) 
   𝛽!,! =  !!! ! !! 𝑎!,!,!!∈!!!∈!∧!!!     (8) 
 
where we define 𝑝 = min (𝑃!). Note that both parameters 𝛼 
and 𝛽 represent averages of the attenuation values that were 
present in the SINR expression. Equation (6) is an 
approximation of the average SINR experienced by the users 
of a secondary network. It is equivalent to  assuming that 
instead of multiple users, each network serves only one user 
whose SINR represents the average experienced by the actual 
users. To this end, we calculate 𝛼!,! which represents the 
average of the channel gains of the users of the network and 𝛽!,! which is the average of all the attenuation factors from the 
interfering networks to the users of the secondary network 
under consideration. The last equation is another 
simplification: instead of considering multiple interfering 
networks, we simplify the expression to consider only one 
interfering network, whose interfering effect we assume to be 
the average of all the interfering networks. Consequently, in 
order to adhere to a strict definition of a congestion game, we 
lose some of the realism in our utility function, i.e., we are not 
able to fully capture how the networks affect each other. 
However, by making a slight modification to 𝜂!, we manage 
to take into account the different transmit powers of the 
different network types. This modification allows certain 
players to be counted as multiple players when counting the 
number of players selecting a specific resource c. Namely, if a 
network with a high transmit power chooses resource c we 
increment the 𝜂! value by a number higher than 1. Only for 
the network with the lowest transmit power, we increment the 𝜂! value by 1 and then for every other network type with 
stronger transmit power we increment by an integer value 
proportional to the transmit power. We proceed to define an 
integer weight parameter for each player 𝑤! ∼ 𝑃!/min (𝑃!). 
Finally we define the weighted number of players 𝜂!, given by 
the following expression 
 𝜂! = 𝑤!𝜎!,!!∈!               (9) 
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Although 𝜂! is no longer strictly the number of players 
selecting resource c, it is still a valid congestion value and it is 
universally known to all the players. From the perspective of a 
single player, this implies no change in the game structure, 
because one player transmitting at higher power is equivalent 
to multiple players transmitting at lower powers, if the 
interference caused is equivalent. Note, that users in each 
network can sense the interference they receive from other 
networks, and can report this information to their base station 
or access point. Furthermore, we assume that networks can 
identify what kind of other networks are also in the area, while 
the weights can be predetermined for each type of network 
and known in advance by all the players. 
However it must be noted that in the classic congestion 
game the utility function is identical for all the players. Since 
parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 are network specific, it means that our 
game is not a straightforward congestion game but rather a 
game with congestion-averse utilities (CAG), as defined in 
[24]. In CAGs, in contrast with classic congestion game, 
utility functions can indeed depend on player identities.  
A strategic game is said to be congestion-averse if its utility 
function satisfies the following three conditions: 
i. monotonically decreases as congestion increases,  
ii. is submodular in that the “better” collection of 
resources a player uses — the less incentive he has 
to add new resources, and  
iii. is independent of irrelevant alternatives, i.e., a 
player’s preference between two resources depends 
only on congestion on the resources in question, 
and is independent of the congestion level on the 
other resources. 
 
Definition 1 
 
Let us define a game 
 Γ = {𝑁,𝐶, 𝑆! ,𝜋! 𝜂! }                                             (10) 
 
where N, the set of secondary networks is the set of players; 
C, the set of available TVWS channels, is the set of 
elementary resources; 𝑆!  is the set of possible pure 
strategies of player n; strategy 𝑠! ∈ 𝑆! can be any possible 
combination of channels c from the set C.  𝜋! is the utility of 
player n when selecting strategy 𝑠!  ∈ 𝑆!: 
 𝜋!(𝑠!, 𝒔!𝒏) = 𝜋!,!(!∈!! 𝜂!) − 𝜌! 𝜎!,!!∈!!     (11) 
 
where 𝒔!𝒏denotes the strategies chosen by all players other 
than n. We recall that 𝜂!  depends also on the strategies of 
other players. 
Note that we have introduced an additional component to 
our utility expression, which we call the cost component. Here 𝜌! is the price paid per resource selected. This additional 
component is necessary to transform the game into a CAG as 
discussed below, and also to ensure a degree of fairness  
among networks. From a practical point of view, it is also 
reasonable to expect networks to pay a certain price for each 
resource used; indeed whenever a network decides to use 
additional resources, it does so at a specific expense, 
especially in terms of consumed energy, which in some types 
of networks can be a significant limitation.  
It can easily now follow from the above discussion that:  
 
Proposition 1. 
The game given by definition 2 is a CAG game, given 𝜌! > 0.  
 
Proof. Note that the utility of each network will be a sum 
over the utilities obtained at each resource:  
 𝜋! = 𝜋!,!(𝜂!)!∈!!               (12) 
 
The utility provided in (6) directly satisfies condition (i) due 
to the definition we have provided for 𝜋!,!, which is 
monotonically decreasing in 𝜂! . Because we assume 
independence between the TVWS channels available, we also 
satisfy condition (iii), since the utility at each resource c, is not 
affected by the congestion level at other resources. If we keep 
the utility expression without the cost component, i.e., 𝜋! = 𝜋!,!(𝜂!)!∈!! , condition (ii) is not satisfied. Indeed, 
because the overall utility is the sum of utilities over all 
selected resources, the best strategy will always include the 
selection of all available resources. This happens because 
regardless of the congestion value, the utility value at each 
resource is always positive, leading to a situation where even a 
heavily congested resource will contribute positively to the 
final utility value. It is therefore necessary to introduce a cost 
component to the utility to demotivate networks to select 
resources that bring about marginal contributions.  
We introduce a simple linear cost component which 
imposes a specific price to be paid for each resource selection. 
Imposing 𝜌! > 0, we satisfy condition (ii) since now clearly 
we have a mechanism which enables the networks to discard 
those heavily congested resources whose marginal 
contribution to the final utility  does not justify the cost that 
needs to be paid. That means that once a good selection is 
reached, the network has no incentive to pay an additional cost 
to include additional resources which payback little in terms of 
utility. Therefore, we conclude that the game defined in 
Definition 2 is a CAG game.■   
CAG was used to model the problem of choosing 
recharging stations for Electrical Vehicles in [25]. Here we 
introduced a game and showed that it is a CAG game, for the 
context of SCDM. In [24] it has been proven that these CAG 
games also possess pure Nash Equilibria (NE), which can 
moreover be reached in polynomial time.  
B. Reaching the Nash Equilibrium 
CAG games are known to possess the single profitable 
move property (SPMP). The SPMP implies that once the 
players choose a strategy profile from which there is no 
profitable elementary move, then the strategy is in fact a pure 
Nash Equilibrium.  
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There are three types of elementary moves in the context of 
CAGs: 1) additions, instances of including a new channel to 
the strategy; 2) drops, instances of excluding a channel from a 
strategy and 3) switches, which consist in dropping a selected 
channel by replacing it with another.  
The authors in [24] prove that CAGs indeed possess the 
SPMP property and further provide an algorithm which 
reaches the  NE in polynomial time.  
Specifically, the authors use two types of sequences of 
elementary moves to construct their algorithm. First they 
define a drop ladder which is a sequence defined by one drop 
in the beginning, followed by several switches. Next, they also 
define a swap ladder, which is a drop ladder concluded by an 
addition. Moreover, the authors argue that it is not necessary 
to consider all possible combinations of such elementary 
moves, but only those that result in maximum gain, i.e., 
maximally profitable moves. Consequently the drop and swap 
ladders become sequences of maximally profitable moves, 
rather than ordinary moves. 
The logic of the algorithm is rather straightforward: if the 
game is started from a strategy which is stable both against 
additions or switches (AS-stable profile), then if the players 
proceed by building maximal drop ladders, which may 
terminate as swap ladders, the game will eventually reach a 
NE. This relies mainly on the fact that there can only be a 
limited number of swap ladders consecutively [24]. The 
authors show that the algorithm requires O(N2R2)  elementary 
changes. 
Here, we present the same algorithm adapted to our 
particular self-coexistence problem. Note that the algorithm 
must be initiated from a strategy profile, s, which has no 
profitable additions or switches left., i.e., AS-stable A strategy 
profile is the set of channels chosen by individual networks. 
One such strategy profile is when all networks select all 
available channels.  
Algorithm 1 is applied iteratively until none of the networks 
have any single profitable moves left. Note that the individual 
networks independently perform step 2 - 34,, and since this is 
a decentralized scheme, the networks don’t interact with each 
other. Each network can decide to change their strategy, i.e., 
initiate the algorithm, based on their own sensing information, 
or feedback they receive from their users. The different 
network operators will update their strategies whenever they 
sense a new network is transmitting (interference level 
increases), or when they notice a drop in the interference level 
due to one of the networks leaving or changing their strategy.  
Input to the algorithm are the network-specific parameters 
we defined in the previous section, 𝛼!,! and 𝛽!,!, as well as the 
price parameters 𝜌. As suggested previously in this paper, we 
start from the AS-stable strategy, s, in which all networks 
choose all available channels. The procedure described next is 
performed by each network independently. In lines 3-5, the 
network calculates the gain in utility for each possible drop, 𝐷!,!. In lines 9-10, the network chooses the channel with the 
highest  𝐷!,! value (provided that it is positive), and drops the 
selected channel from its strategy, initiating a drop ladder 
sequence. Then it proceeds to calculate the gains in utility for 
every possible switch, 𝑆!,!,!!, between two channels c and c’, 
in lines 13-15. Again, it chooses the duplet of channels (c,c’) 
which maximize the value of 𝑆!,!,!!, and performs the switch 
(lines 18-21).  
 
Algorithm 1: Reaching a NE  
Input: 𝛼,𝛽, 𝜌, s 
1: for all 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 
2:        Calculate 𝜋! given 𝑠! ∈ 𝒔 
3:        for all 𝑐 ∈ 𝑠! 
4:               𝑠!!"#$ ← 𝑠! − 𝑐 
5:               Calculate 𝜋!!"#$ given 𝑠!!"#$ 
6:                𝐷!,! = 𝜋!!"#$ − 𝜋! 
7:        end for 
8:        if max 𝐷!,! > 0  
9:             𝑐! ← max! 𝐷!,! 
10:          𝑠!∗ ← 𝑠! − 𝑐! 
11:          Calculate 𝜋!∗  given 𝑠!∗  
12:                 for all 𝑐 ∈ 𝑠! ∗ and 𝑐′ ∉ 𝑠!∗  
13:                        𝑠!!"#$ ← 𝑠! − 𝑐 + 𝑐′ 
14:                     Calculate 𝜋!!"#$ given 𝑠!!"#$ 
15:                        𝑆!,!,!! ← 𝜋!!"#$ − 𝜋!∗  
16:                 end for 
17:                 if max 𝑆!,!,!! > 0 
18:                  𝑐! ← max! 𝑆!,!,!! 
19:                 𝑐! ← max!! 𝑆!,!,!! 
20:                𝑠!∗ ← 𝑠!∗ − 𝑐! + 𝑐! 
21:                      Calculate 𝜋!∗  given 𝑠!∗  
22:                     for all 𝑐 ∉ 𝑠!∗  
23                             𝑠!!"#$ ← 𝑠!∗ + 𝑐 
24:                          Calculate 𝜋!!"#$ given 𝑠!!"#$ 
25:                             𝐴!,! ← 𝜋!!"#$ − 𝜋!∗  
26:                     end for 
27:                     if max 𝐴!,! > 0 
28:                        𝑐 ← max! 𝐴!,! 
29:                      𝑠!∗ ← 𝑠!∗ + 𝑐 
30:                          Calculate 𝜋!∗  given 𝑠!∗  
31:                         Go to step 3. 
32:                      else 
33:                     Repeat steps 12-31  
34:                     end if 
35:                  end if       
36:            end if                 
37:     end for                                   
 
Once a switch is performed, the network checks whether there 
is a channel among the unselected channels which would bring 
about a profit in utility (lines 23-25). If there is, the network 
adds the channel with the highest gain (lines 28-29). This, 
completes a swap ladder, therefore the player starts building 
the new drop/swap ladder, going back to line 3. While there 
are no profitable additions, the network continues switching 
channels until there are profitable switches left, thus building 
consecutive drop ladders. The algorithm terminates, when 
there are no more drop/swap ladders left. 
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
We apply the algorithm for reaching NE  in CAG-s, both in 
a centralized (for comparative purposes) and decentralized 
manner, and compare it to the centralized algorithm (FACT) 
proposed in [20] which models the channel allocation problem 
in SCDM as an energy-minimization problem. The algorithm, 
is used as a comparison benchmark for the decentralized 
solution we propose.   
We simulate a scenario with N=20 secondary networks, 
spread randomly over an area of 1km square. The secondary 
networks can be of three types 1) IEEE 802.22, 2) IEE 
802.11af  and 3) IEEE 802.15. Each type of network has 
different configurations, different transmit powers and 
different operating ranges. We assume a central frequency 𝑓! = 700 𝑀𝐻𝑧. All antennas are considered omnidirectional. 
The price parameter 𝜌 is fixed for all networks at 𝜌 = 5. 
 
Fig. 2 Meeting the bandwidth demand 
 
 
Fig. 3 Fairness 
 
We simulate, using MATLAB software, a number of users 
for each network, randomly dropped within their operating 
range. The number of available TVWS channels is varied 
from 1 to 20, and we consider they have fixed 8 MHz 
bandwidth. The output of each SCDM algorithm is a strategy 
which identifies which channels are allocated to which 
network. Once the strategies are obtained, we calculate the 
SINR and the rate each user can obtain at the selected channel 
using the Shannon capacity formula: 
 𝑟! = 𝜔!  log!(1 + 𝛾!,!)!"#!∈!!         (13) 
 
where W is the channel bandwidth. Note that the individual 
attenuation values between transmitters and receivers are 
calculated using the free-space path loss model.  
   
The utility of each network is also calculated using the 
formulas provided in the previous section. When the game is 
solved centrally, we assume the presence of a controller with 
global knowledge, who applies Algorithm 1 on behalf of the 
networks. Furthermore, the profitability of the moves is 
calculated with respect to global utility rather than the 
individual network utilities. We assume that each network 
demands a certain number of channels and this demand is 
generated randomly between 15 and 25.  
 
Firstly we compare the two algorithms in their ability to 
satisfy the demands of the networks, which is calculated as the 
ratio between the number of channels allocated and channels 
requested (demand). This is shown in Fig. 2. Note that demand 
is evaluated only in terms of number of channels allocated, 
and not on the quality obtained at each specific channel. We 
observe that as expected, the centralized CAG algorithm 
significantly outperforms the FACT algorithm, which is also a 
centralized algorithm. While the performance of the 
decentralized CAG algorithm is poorer, it still performs better 
than FACT.  
 
Secondly, we evaluate the fairness of each algorithm by 
using the Jain Fairness index defined as: ℑ 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… , 𝑥! = !!!!!! !! !!!!!!!             (14) 
 
where 𝑥! represents the average user rate of network i. As 
shown in Fig. 3 the CAG game solved centrally performs best 
in terms of fairness. FACT improves steadily as the number of 
available channels increases, but does not outperform the 
decentralized CAG although FACT itself is a centralized 
algorithm. This is a significant result, implying that even when 
networks independently make decisions according to 
Algorithm 1, they are able to reach a good level of fairness.  
It should be noted that one of the objectives of the FACT 
algorithm is indeed ensuring fairness, however fairness is only 
considered with respect to number of channels allocated to 
each network, and not the quality of the channels allocated, 
which is what is highlighted in these results.  
Moreover, we also look at the theoretical rates obtained by 
each individual user. We fix the number of available channels 
to C=20 and plot the CDF of the per-user rates for each type of 
network in Fig. 4. We observe that in general the rates 
obtained with CAG are much higher than those obtained with 
FACT for all types of users. 
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a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
Fig. 4 CDF of average user rates for users of a) Type 1 networks; b) Type 2 
networks and c) Type 3 networks 
 
Again, this is due to the fact that the FACT algorithm does 
not take into account the quality obtained at each allocated 
channel. Note how the per-user rate for type 2 and 3 networks, 
which transmit at much lower transmit power than type 1, is 
much higher with CAG central game than the FACT 
algorithm. The decentralized implementation indeed performs 
almost as good as the centralized algorithm which is 
remarkable considering that the decentralized implementation 
does not require overhead or global knowledge.  
Finally, we also compare the performance of the CAG 
algorithm to the optimal solution with respect to the global 
utility. Due to the difficulty of finding the optimal solution at 
the global level, we compare the algorithm performance in a 
small-scale scenario, involving N=3 networks and C=4 
available channels.  
 
Fig. 5 Performance of the CAG algorithm compared to the optimal solution in 
three key metrics: global utility, percentage of demand met and fairness. 
 
In Fig. 5 we show how both implementation of the CAG 
algorithm fare when compared to the optimal solution. It is 
clear that in terms of global utility, the centralized 
implementation performs almost as well as the optimal 
solution, but the decentralized solution performs almost as 
well. In terms of demand met, the decentralized solution is 
able to meet all the demands of the different networks, which 
is due to the fact that since the networks do not have a global 
perspective, they tend to act more selfishly. In terms of 
fairness, all three approaches perform quite well.  
 
Fig. 6 CDF of average user rates  
In Fig. 6 we also show the CDF of the average user rates 
obtained when applying the CAG algorithm and the optimal 
solution. It is quite evident that in terms of this metric, the 
performance of the CAG algorithm is indistinguishable from 
the optimal solution. Therefore, in terms of practical uses of 
the CAG algorithm, we can conclude that the performance is 
near optimal.  
We note however, that the algorithm we propose may result 
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in outcomes in which some networks are not allocated any 
channels at all. Such is the case in our simulation results for 
some of the Type 1 networks, which have the highest transmit 
powers. However, we note that by calibrating the price value 
for each network individually, such outcomes can be avoided, 
however, such moves may result in degraded performance in 
terms of fairness, a trade-off we plan to explore in future 
works. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper we address the problem of self-coexistence in 
between secondary networks in a cognitive radio environment. 
The task of sharing the common set of available channels in 
the TVWS, accessible to secondary users, is an important 
issue that needs to be tackled to ensure efficient use of the 
limited resources. We propose a decentralized scheme for this 
important self-coexistence task, based on a game theoretic 
approach. Decentralization is a desirable feature in these kinds 
of scenarios, where we have different types of secondary 
networks, operating with different technologies. We model the 
SCDM problem as a non-cooperative game between 
heterogeneous secondary networks, and verify that the game 
belongs to the class of games with congestion-averse utilities 
(CAG), which are known to have at least one pure Nash 
Equilibrium. Taking advantage of properties of such games we 
propose to use the framework provided in [26] to build an 
algorithm which can be applied by coexisting secondary 
networks independently.   
A decentralized and centralized (for comparative purposes) 
implementation of the algorithm have been developed. 
Extensive experimental simulations show that the 
implementation of the proposed algorithm (centralized and 
decentralized) outperforms existing centralized FACT 
algorithm proposed in [20] in terms of bandwidth demand, 
fairness and achieved theoretical user rates. 
In the future we plan to enhance our model by including 
realistic channel models to account for propagation losses. 
Also, another aspect which we plan to consider is the inclusion 
of channels with different characteristics in terms of 
bandwidth and quality of service requirements.  
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